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This paper explores a new role for venture capitalists, as knowledge intermediaries. A
venture capital investor can communicate valuable knowledge to an entrepreneur, facilitat-
ing innovation. The venture capitalist can also communicate the entrepreneur’s innovative
knowledge to other portfolio companies. We study the costs and benefits of these two forms
of knowledge transfer, and their implications for investment, innovation, and product mar-
ket competition. The model also sheds light on the choice between venture capital and
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Innovative start-up firms often produce valuable new knowledge. Investors who are closely in-
volved with the start-ups they finance, such as venture capitalists1, typically have direct access
to this innovative knowledge, while outsiders do not. These investors are therefore in a very
favorable position to act as knowledge intermediaries, transferring knowledge between the differ-
ent companies they are involved with2. This paper investigates the role of venture capitalists in
knowledge transfer. Much of the theoretical literature has explored instead their role as monitors
and/or providers of advice and support. We abstract from these to focus on knowledge transfer.
Evidence on knowledge transfer by venture capitalists is difficult to obtain, but several em-
pirical studies suggest it plays an important role. Some direct evidence based on patent citations
comes from Gonzalez-Uribe (2013), who finds that venture capitalists diffuse knowledge about
their existing patented innovations among their portfolio companies. Evidence that venture cap-
italists also transfer valuable non-patented knowledge is presented by Pahnke et al. (2014), based
on interviews with entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and industry experts. There is, moreover,
indirect evidence, highlighting the importance of knowledge transfer in other, similar settings.
Helmers et al. (2013) find that information transmission through interlocking boards of directors
has a significant positive effect on innovation. Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) show that firms are
disinclined to share investment banks with other firms in the same industry, but only when the
firms engage in product-market competition (suggesting concern over the possibility of knowledge
transfer to competitors)3.
We develop a theoretical model to study the costs and benefits of knowledge transfer, as
well as the implications for investment, firm performance and innovation. Our analysis identifies
the circumstances in which innovative start-ups can benefit from venture capital finance, taking
fully into account the likelihood that some of the innovative knowledge they generate will be
transmitted by the venture capitalists to other portfolio companies, including competitors. The
model has an ex-ante innovation stage, followed by an ex-post commercialization stage. An
entrepreneur with an innovative project may develop a valuable innovation at the end of the
1Gorman and Sahlman (1989) find that lead venture investors visit each portfolio company an average of
19 times per year and spend 100 hours in direct contact (onsite or by phone) with the company. Sahlman
(1990) highlights venture capitalists’ involvement with their portfolio companies in a variety of ways, including
the recruitment and compensation of key individuals, strategic decisions, and links with suppliers and customers.
Bottazzi et al. (2008) provide further evidence of active involvement by venture capitalists and frequent interaction
with their portfolio firms. Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2003) show that venture capitalists often hold seats on the
board, as well as substantial voting and control rights.
2Many of these will be innovative start-ups, although it is worth noting that venture capitalists also often
serve on boards of mature public firms (see Celikyurt et al. (2012)).
3Atanasov et al. (2008) find that 47% of a sample of VC-related lawsuits involve allegations of ”tunneling”
(wrongful transfers of assets, expropriation of profitable opportunities, etc.), suggesting that concern over reputa-
tion is not always sufficient to deter such behavior. Knowledge transfer is typically much harder to demonstrate,
and hence easier to undertake.
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first stage; the innovation then has to be commercialized in the second stage in order to yield
financial returns at the end. We begin by studying the case where the valuable innovation
cannot be protected through a patent. We analyze two forms of knowledge transfer by the
venture capitalist (VC) who funds the project: ex ante, the VC may, by incurring a private cost
C, communicate useful knowledge obtained from other firms to the entrepreneur. This inward
knowledge transfer helps the entrepreneur to develop a valuable innovation. Ex post, once the
entrepreneur has innovated successfully, the VC may communicate this innovative knowledge to
other firms. We assume this outward knowledge transfer has a beneficial effect on the other
companies, yielding a gain, G, for the VC. However, it also reduces the entrepreneur’s expected
profitability through a competition effect, parameterized by k. In general, the parameters C, G
and k can vary across the firms in a VC portfolio, depending on the characteristics of the project
and the resulting innovation. For example, some innovations may generate greater positive
spillovers than others, affecting G, while the extent to which knowledge sharing leads to erosion
of profits through competition may vary with industry and product characteristics, affecting k
and C.4
We study optimal contracts between the entrepreneur and the VC. While inward knowledge
transfer is always beneficial for the venture, outward knowledge transfer has several effects. It
has a direct negative impact on profitability through increased competition, but also an indirect
positive impact because it relaxes the venture capitalist’s participation constraint. The first
of these channels tends to reduce entrepreneurial effort, while the second tends to increase it.
Moreover, outward knowledge transfer interacts with the venture capitalist’s ex-ante incentives to
engage in inward knowledge transfer. The interplay of these effects determines the optimal choice
of VC contract. We find that, depending on parameter values, the two forms of knowledge transfer
can emerge as substitutes or complements, with quite different implications for innovation and
profitability. For intermediate values of potential spillovers (G), the optimal contract either gives
the VC a low financial stake in the venture and induces outward knowledge transfer, or it gives
the VC a higher financial stake and induces inward knowledge transfer. For higher values of
potential spillovers, optimal contracts induce both forms of knowledge transfer.
We then explore the entrepreneur’s choice between VC and non-VC (no knowledge transfer)
finance. The main drawback of VC finance is due to the cost of inducing the VC not to transfer
knowledge outwards when the spillover benefit G is below a critical threshold. We show that, as
a consequence, the trade-off between the two forms of finance can be non-monotonic in G: for
low and high values of G, VC finance is preferred; while for intermediate values of G, non-VC
finance dominates. An interesting special case of our model occurs when outward knowledge
transfer benefits (only) non-competitors (k > 1): VC finance then always dominates non-VC
4In empirical work, heterogeneity among portfolio companies in terms of their positions in technology space
and product market space could be used to investigate some of our model’s predictions, in the spirit of Bloom
et al. (2013)
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finance. In practice, however, evidence on indirect ties among VC portfolio companies suggests
that the transfer of knowledge to competitors is an important phenomenon: Pahnke et al. (2014)
find that 53% of the VC-backed start-ups in their sample share a VC investor with a competitor.
They also present interview evidence on the nature of knowledge transfer, highlighting flows of
information about product design as well as regulatory experiences.
Our model sheds light on the costs and benefits of knowledge transfer between competitors,
implemented by venture capitalists. One implication is that, other things held equal, venture
capitalists will prefer to syndicate their investments with a relatively small and stable set of
partners, so as to internalize knowledge spillovers between portfolio companies and the associated
financial externalities. This is consistent with evidence on syndication patterns among venture
capitalists in Bubna et al. (2014).
In section 4, we go on to study the case of patentable innovations. We allow for some un-
certainty over the outcome of patent applications, and for the fact that the patent application
process can disclose information to competitors. One of our main objectives in this section is
to investigate the determinants of the decision to apply for patent protection. We find that
these differ depending on how the firm is financed, with VC-funded firms exhibiting a greater
propensity to apply for a patent (holding constant the quality of the innovation). This is not due
to fear of expropriation by the VC, but rather to the fact that the VC’s role as knowledge inter-
mediary offers protection against the loss associated with expropriation by competitors following
information disclosure and patent rejection. Our results provide a rationale for the empirical
evidence showing that venture capital has a significant positive effect on innovation measured by
patent counts5. In our model, this is due to two effects: first, inward knowledge transfer by the
VC increases the probability of a valuable innovation; second, VC-funded firms are more likely
to apply for patent protection. Teasing out the relative importance of these two effects is an
interesting avenue for future empirical research6.
Section 4 also studies the use of contingencies in venture capital contracts; specifically,
whether and how optimal contracts condition on the approval or rejection of a patent applica-
tion. Our results imply that, in general, optimal contracts will not condition on patent approval,
with one exception: for some parameter values, contracts designed to induce inward knowledge
transfer and deter outward knowledge transfer will optimally offer a lower (higher) financial stake
to the VC when a patent is (not) granted. This is consistent with evidence from Kaplan and
Stromberg (2003): they find that contingent contracts rewarding the entrepreneur on the basis
of non-financial performance are used in almost 9% of financing rounds in their sample - with
5Kortum and Lerner (2000) , Mollica and Zingales (2007), Ueda and Hirukawa (2008).
6In a different context, Helmers et al. (2013) are able to exploit the occurrence of an exogenous corporate
governance reform and an exogenous change to the patent system in India to identify a positive effect of board
interlocks on R&D spending, as well as a separate positive effect on patenting propensity.
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patent approval being one of the main contingencies7.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We complete this section by discussing
the related theoretical literature. Section 2 presents the baseline model. We study the case of
innovations that cannot be patented in section 3, and patentable innovations in section 4. Section
5 concludes.
1.1 Relationship to theoretical literature
There is a large theoretical literature on the role of venture capitalists, which focuses primarily
on monitoring8 and advice/support9. We add a new role, as knowledge intermediaries. In this
respect, the closest papers to ours are Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995), Ueda (2004) and Yosha
(1995). Bhattacharya and Chiesa consider an economy with many industries: in each industry,
two rival firms engage in an R&D race. There are two banks in the economy. Bhattacharya and
Chiesa compare bilateral financing, in which each bank finances only one of the rivals in each
industry, with multilateral financing, in which each bank provides half of the funding of each
rival in each industry. Being one of the financiers gives access to any knowledge produced by
the firm at the interim stage. At this stage, financiers decide whether to disclose the knowledge
produced by one firm to its rival: this is the link with our paper. The setting is completely
different though, and the main focus of Bhattacharya and Chiesa is the effect of a commitment
to knowledge sharing on firms’ ex-ante incentives to invest in R&D. Yosha (1995) also studies the
choice between bilateral and multilateral financing, under the assumption that the latter entails
a lower cost but greater leakage of information to competitors10,11.
Ueda (2004) explores the trade-off between bank and VC finance under the assumption that
venture capitalists, unlike banks, may steal an entrepreneur’s idea at the ex-ante financing stage
(before the project is undertaken); on the other hand, venture capitalists have greater ability to
evaluate projects.12 We focus instead on knowledge transfer after the project has been funded
and undertaken.
A few other papers have studied the choice between venture capital and bank finance, focusing
7An example is the payment of committed funding (by the VC) when a patent is approved. In such cases, the
VC may still provide funding if the patent is not approved, but will typically do so on terms more favorable to
the VC.
8See, for example, Dess´ı (2005) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).
9See, among others, Bottazzi et al. (2009),Casamatta (2003), Cestone (2014) , Cumming et al. (2005) ,
De Bettignies and Brander (2007), Dess´ı (2010), Hellmann (1998), Jeng and Wells (2000), Lerner and Schoar
(2005), Repullo and Suarez (2000, 2004), Riyanto and Schwienbacher (2006), and Schmidt (2003).
10Thus higher quality firms, who have more to lose from information leakage, prefer bilateral financing.
11See also Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983), who examine the trade-off between information disclosure to com-
petitors and raising finance on better terms on capital markets.
12See also Biais and Perotti (2008), who study an entrepreneur’s decision to hire experts when different forms
of expertise are valuable but experts may steal a good idea, and Hellmann and Perotti (2011), who examine the
costs and benefits of circulating initially incomplete ideas (completion versus appropriation).
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on quite different trade-offs from those examined in our paper. Winton and Yerramilli (2008)
assume that venture capitalists have a greater ability to evaluate possible continuation strategies
for the firm. A trade-off arises because VCs are also assumed to have a higher cost of capital.
Landier (2003) views the choice between VC and bank finance as determined by a hold-up
problem: when investors need protection against hold-up by the entrepreneur, venture capital
with staged financing is preferred; when the entrepreneur needs protection against hold-up by
investors, long-term bank finance is preferred.
2 The Baseline Model
The model has two stages, with three corresponding dates, t = 0, 1, 2. All agents (entrepreneur
and investors) are assumed to be risk neutral and protected by limited liability.
2.1 Project
Consider an entrepreneur (start-up firm) endowed with an innovative investment project. The
project starts with an innovative idea and requires a contractible initial investment I (money) at
the beginning of the first stage (date 0). During the first stage, the idea may be developed into a
valuable innovation. For example, we can think of the entrepreneur as having an idea for a new
product to begin with; he then undertakes some initial production and carries out the tests/trials
required to establish that it works well and satisfies appropriate quality standards. If the first
stage is successful, the innovation then needs to be commercialized: here the entrepreneur’s effort
is crucial, key strategic decisions have to be made, new personnel may need to be recruited, and
so on13. We assume that if the innovation has been developed successfully (at date 1), and in
the absence of knowledge transfer (see below), the project will finally succeed at date 2 with
probability e, where e captures the entrepreneur’s effort during the second stage. Irrespective
of the entrepreneur’s effort, success is never certain, thus e < 1. If the initial innovative idea
fails to be developed into a valuable innovation14, the project’s success probability is reduced;
for simplicity, we assume it is equal to zero. If the project succeeds at date 2, it yields verifiable
returns R; if it fails, it yields nothing (R > 0).
2.2 Entrepreneur
The entrepreneur has no initial monetary wealth, and needs to raise finance from outside in-
vestors. If he is able to secure outside funding and undertake the project (and absent knowledge
13We focus here on entrepreneurs, who will manage the business and try to make it succeed, rather than pure
inventors, who may prefer to exit as soon as they have developed a valuable innovation.
14For expositional convenience, we will refer to this as the ”no innovation” outcome.
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transfer, see below), he develops a successful innovation with probability pi. He then chooses his
effort level e, where 0 ≤ e < 1, and the cost of effort is given by c(e) ≡ 1
2
e2. To make the analysis
interesting, we assume that R > I
pi
, otherwise the project would not be worth financing (absent
knowledge transfer). Given our assumptions about effort, we normalize both R and I to be less
than one15.
2.3 Investors
Investors provide the initial funding I for the project. We assume they are competitive, earning
zero expected profits in equilibrium.
In our model the main difference between venture capitalists and other investors lies in the
venture capitalists’ close connections16 with their portfolio firms, implying that venture capi-
talists (henceforth VCs) can transfer knowledge relatively easily between the firms they fund.
In particular, we assume that VCs would find it easier to transfer knowledge than any out-
siders, including other, arm’s length investors, since they interact closely and repeatedly with
the entrepreneur, and have privileged access to information throughout the time in which the
innovation is being developed. For simplicity, we capture this difference by assuming that VCs,
unlike other investors, can transfer knowledge. As we shall see, this brings about both benefits
and costs. To focus on the trade-off between these costs and benefits, we abstract from other
roles played by venture capitalists, such as monitoring or screening, which have been studied
extensively in the theoretical literature on venture capital.
2.4 Knowledge transfer
We consider two forms of knowledge transfer. The VC may communicate valuable knowledge to
the entrepreneur (e.g. information acquired through his involvement with other portfolio firms)
during the first stage, while the innovation is being developed. We model this as increasing the
probability of a valuable innovation, from pi to pi + τ (τ > 0). The VC incurs a private cost C
in doing this (e.g. opportunity cost of time, effort, or lower expected returns on his investment
in other portfolio firms). We refer to this as inward knowledge transfer, or ex ante knowledge
transfer because it occurs in the first stage of our model. The second form of knowledge transfer
is outward, or ex post, knowledge transfer, whereby the VC transfers knowledge to another firm
once the entrepreneur has successfully developed an innovation, in a way that is beneficial to
the other firm (and to the VC), but has an adverse effect on the entrepreneur’s profitability,
due to greater competition. We model this as bringing a private benefit of value G > 0 to the
15In the simplest case and absent knowledge transfer considerations, the socially optimal effort is given by
e∗ = arg maxe eR − 12e2 . The first order condition tells us e∗ = R. Since we have assumed e < 1, we must also
have R < 1. Given that R > Ipi , this further implies I < 1.
16See footnote 1.
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VC, reflecting the value of positive spillovers, while decreasing the success probability of the
entrepreneur’s project from e to ke, with 0 < k < 1. As noted in the Introduction, we shall also
briefly discuss the interesting and analytically simpler case where outward knowledge transfer
benefits only non-competitors (i.e. k > 1).
We assume that the entrepreneur does not observe whether the VC transfers knowledge
outward, and that both forms of knowledge transfer cannot be contracted on explicitly. The VC
will therefore engage in one, or both, if, and only if, this is in his interest. Finally, we allow for the
possibility that, when the VC does not expropriate the entrepreneur’s innovative knowledge, some
of his competitors may later succeed in doing so (e.g. reverse engineering), or may independently
develop an equivalent innovation, which also reduces the success probability of the entrepreneur’s
project from e to ke. We shall treat these two possibilities together, assuming they occur with
probability µ, where 1 > µ > 0. For expositional convenience we will refer to them simply as
expropriation (by competitors).
2.5 Contract design
Contracts specify the investor’s (venture capitalist’s) financial contribution at the beginning (I),
and a sharing rule for final returns, R.
2.6 Patent protection
Section 3 focuses on innovative knowledge that cannot, by its very nature, be protected from
expropriation by a patent. In section 4 we go on to examine patentable innovations. We assume
that, once he has successfully developed an innovation, the entrepreneur can apply for a patent.
The application is approved with probability β < 1.17 If the application is approved, expropria-
tion is no longer feasible, and knowledge transfer to other firms can only occur through licensing.
If the application is rejected, the innovation remains vulnerable to expropriation. Moreover, we
allow for a higher probability of expropriation by competitors in this case, α > µ, reflecting
leakage of information through the patent application.
2.7 Time line
Figure 1 shows the timeline for the baseline model.
17We treat β as a parameter of the model, capturing the efficiency of the patent system, and/or the character-
istics of the product or process.
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Figure 1: Timeline for the Baseline Model
T=0 T=1 T=2










We begin by considering innovative knowledge that cannot, by its very nature, obtain patent
protection. Section 4 will study patentable innovations. We examine first the case where the
entrepreneur raises the required external funding from a non-VC investor, then go on to analyze
the case of VC funding. In each case, we study optimal contracts between the entrepreneur and
the investor. Finally, we examine the entrepreneur’s optimal choice between VC and non-VC
finance.
3.1 Non-VC investor
At date 0, the entrepreneur secures external funding for his project from a non-VC investor.
The contract signed with the investor maximizes the entrepreneur’s expected payoff, subject
to guaranteeing zero expected profits to the investor (since we are assuming that investors are
competitive). The contract specifies the investor’s capital contribution, I, and the share of final
returns going to each party: RNe for the entrepreneur, R − RNe for the investor. To study the
optimal contracting problem, we apply backward induction and start with the effort decision of
the entrepreneur at the second stage. The optimal effort level exerted by the entrepreneur is
given by18 eN = argmaxe e(1−µ+µk)RNe − 12e2. The first order condition gives us eN = ωRNe ,
where ω = (1− µ+ µk).
18Recall that expropriation is not observed by the entrepreneur: he therefore chooses his effort knowing that
other firms will expropriate with probability µ, and that when this happens his probability of success will be
reduced to ke.
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Thus, the optimal contract solves:
max
RNe




s.t. eN = ωRNe (ICe)
pieNω(R−RNe ) ≥ I (PCi)
⇐⇒
max RNe
s.t. y ≥ I
piω2
where y = RNe (R−RNe ), ω = 1− µ+ µk
When condition (I ≤ piω2R2
4
) 19 is satisfied20, the optimal contract is given by RNe ≥ R2 , where
RNe is the largest root of piω
2RNe (R−RNe ) = I.
3.2 VC investor
We now study how the contracting problem differs when the entrepreneur obtains external finance
from a venture capitalist. As discussed earlier, we focus on one, so far under-explored difference
between venture capitalists and other investors: by virtue of their close involvement with portfolio
firms, VCs can more easily transfer knowledge between them. From the perspective of the
entrepreneur in our model, knowledge transfer can take two forms. The first is inward (ex-
ante) knowledge transfer, whereby the VC communicates valuable knowledge to him during the
innovation stage. The second is outward (ex-post) knowledge transfer, whereby the VC transfers
the entrepreneur’s knowledge to other firms once he has developed a valuable innovation, in a way
that reduces the entrepreneur’s profitability (expropriation). Recall from section 2 that outward
knowledge transfer reduces the entrepreneur’s success probability from e to ke (k < 1), because
of greater competition, while yielding a private benefit of value G to the venture capitalist,
reflecting the value of positive spillovers.
We model inward knowledge transfer as increasing the probability of a valuable innovation
from pi to pi + τ , where τ > 0. The VC incurs a private cost C > 0 (e.g. opportunity cost of
time, effort, or lower expected returns on his investments in other portfolio firms). Formally, our
modeling of inward knowledge transfer is analogous to models of ”advice and support” in the
theoretical literature on venture capital. We differ from these models in considering also the role
of outward knowledge transfer, and the interaction between the two.
19Note that from PCi, we have piω












20If this condition is not satisfied, the entrepreneur cannot raise the funding needed to undertake his project.
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When the entrepreneur turns to a VC for external finance, he can choose between four different
contracting possibilities. He can design the contract to induce the VC to engage in both types
of knowledge transfer, only one type, or no knowledge transfer. In what follows, we characterize
the optimal contract for each of these possible choices. We then study the entrepreneur’s optimal
choice.
3.2.1 Outward (ex-post) knowledge transfer, or expropriation
We begin by considering the case where the VC only transfers knowledge outward. This reduces
the entrepreneur’s probability of success from e to ke, while yielding a private benefit G > 0 for
the VC. The optimal contract solves the following problem (P1):
max
RV Ne




s.t. eV N = kRV Ne (ICe)
pi[keV N(R−RV Ne ) +G] ≥ I (PCV C)
τ [keV N(R−RV Ne ) +G] ≤ C (ICV C ex ante)
G+ keV N(R−RV Ne ) ≥ ωeV N(R−RV Ne ) (ICV C ex post)
Comparing this with the equivalent problem for the non-VC investor case, we see that the
entrepreneur’s incentive constraint, (ICe), is modified to allow for the fact that the VC always
expropriates ex post, reducing the probability of success. On the other hand, the private benefit
G relaxes the venture capitalist’s participation constraint, (PCV C), making it possible to offer
more high-powered monetary incentives to the entrepreneur (higher RV Ne ). In addition, we have
two new constraints. Since we are considering the case without inward knowledge transfer, it
must be the case that the VC has no incentive to transfer knowledge to the entrepreneur; i.e. the
private cost C is greater than the expected financial return to the VC (ICV C ex ante). Finally, it
must be the case that the VC expects a net gain from transferring the entrepreneur’s knowledge
to competitors (ICV C ex post); i.e. the private benefit G is greater than the reduction in the
VC’s expected return on his investment in the entrepreneur’s project.
The solution to P1 is described in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Inducing the VC investor to transfer knowledge outwards (to other firms) but not










. If G ≥ I
pi
, the optimal
contract sets RV Ne = R. When the inequality holds strictly, the VC will make an additional
payment F ex ante, beyond I, so that the participation constraint holds as an equality; i.e.
piG = I + F . If G < I
pi
, the optimal contract, RV Ne , is determined by the largest root of the
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following equation:
pi[k2RV Ne (R−RV Ne ) +G] = I;
The problem has a solution only when condition pi[k
2R2
4
+G] ≥ I is satisfied.
Proof. See Appendix.




), it is not possible
to induce the VC to participate (which requires that his expected gain from innovative success
be sufficiently large) without transferring knowledge inwards (which increases the probability of
innovative success). Similarly, it is not possible to induce the VC to participate and to expropriate
ex post if the private benefit from expropriation is too low. The final condition simply requires
the investment cost, I, not to be too high relative to the expected benefits from the project, which
include its financial returns as well as the venture capitalist’s private benefit from expropriation.
When the private benefit G and the cost C are not too low, the optimal contract is determined
by the participation constraint of the VC.
Thus contracts inducing (only) outward knowledge transfer may be used when the potential
spillovers from knowledge transfer are significant.
3.2.2 Inward (ex ante) and outward (ex post) knowledge transfer
When the VC transfers knowledge both inwards (”advice”) and outwards (”expropriation”),
we know that the entrepreneur’s effort level eV N is determined by argmaxe keR
V N
e − 12e2 =
kRV Ne (ICe), since the probability of success is reduced to ke by expropriation. The venture
capitalist’s participation constraint is given by:
(pi + τ)[keV N(R−RV Ne ) +G] ≥ I + C (PCV C)
reflecting the higher probability of innovation success (pi+τ) due to advice, as well as the private
benefit G due to expropriation. There are two incentive constraints for the VC. First, he has to
be induced to advise ex ante:
τ [keV N(R−RV Ne ) +G] ≥ C (ICV C ex ante)
Second, he has to be induced to expropriate ex post:
G+ keV N(R−RV Ne ) ≥ ωeV N(R−RV Ne ) (ICV C ex post)
The optimal contract that induces the venture capitalist to advise ex ante and expropriate ex










(ICV C ex ante)
(ICV C ex post)
The solution to P2 is provided in Lemma 2.






}, it is not possible to induce the VC to transfer knowledge











}, the optimal contract is the largest root of the following equation:







The optimal contract will also entail an ex ante fee when the VC participation constraint is
slack, to ensure the VC earns zero expected rents. The solution holds only when condition (pi +
τ)[1
4
k2R2 +G] ≥ I + C is satisfied, otherwise, the problem has no solution.
Proof. See Appendix.
Comparing this with the result for the optimal contract that induces only outward knowledge





the optimal contract which induces both inward and outward knowledge transfer in general offers
a lower stake in the project’s financial returns to the entrepreneur (lower RV Ne ). Specifically, this




). Thus the project’s probability of
final success, once a valuable innovation has been developed, is lower in this case. On the other
hand, the probability of a successful innovation is higher. Essentially, when the cost of advice is
relatively high, the entrepreneur has to relinquish a higher share of final returns to the VC to
induce him to transfer knowledge inwards: this increases the likelihood of innovating successfully
ex ante, but reduces entrepreneurial effort ex post.




), on the other hand, the
only feasible contract is the one that induces both types of knowledge transfer.
3.2.3 Inward (ex ante) knowledge transfer, or advice
We now study the optimal contract when the entrepreneur chooses to induce only inward knowl-
edge transfer by the VC. Following a successful innovation, the project’s success probability is
13
given by e if there is no expropriation by others (with probability 1− µ), and ke otherwise. The
entrepreneur’s expected probability of success when he chooses his effort level is therefore equal
to ωe where ω = 1 − µ + µk, implying that effort is given by eV N = argmaxe ωeRV Ne − 12e2 =
ωRV Ne (ICe). The optimal contract with ex-ante knowledge transfer but no expropriation ex
post is determined by the following program (P3):
max
RV Ne




s.t. eV N = ωRV Ne (ICe)
(pi + τ)[ωeV N(R−RV Ne )] ≥ I + C (PCV C)
τ [ωeV N(R−RV Ne )] ≥ C (ICV C ex ante)
G+ keV N(R−RV Ne ≤ ωeV N(R−RV Ne ) (ICV C ex post)
Comparing this program with those studied earlier, we see that the private benefit G no longer
appears in the venture capitalist’s participation constraint or in his ex-ante incentive constraint.
His ex-post incentive constraint now induces him not to transfer knowledge ex post. The solution
to P3 is described by Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 If the entrepreneur seeks to induce the VC to transfer knowledge ex ante but not ex
post:






}, the optimal contract is the largest root of the following equa-
tion:













}, the optimal contract is the largest root of the following equa-
tion:
(ω − k)ωRV Ne (R−RV Ne ) = G
The optimal contract will entail a fee ex ante if the VC participation constraint is slack. The











Lemma 3 shows that inducing only inward knowledge transfer requires the venture capitalist’s
private benefit from outward knowledge transfer to be below a critical threshold value. When the
14




), there are two possibilities: either the VC participation
constraint binds, or his ex-post incentive constraint (requiring him to refrain from expropriation)




), either his ex-ante incentive
constraint (requiring him to transfer knowledge inwards) binds, or his ex-post incentive constraint
binds.
3.2.4 No Knowledge Transfer
Finally, we study under what conditions the venture capitalist chooses not to engage in any form
of knowledge transfer. In this case, the VC acts in the same way as the non-VC investor: the
difference lies in the constraints that must be satisfied for the VC to refrain from transferring
knowledge, yielding a different optimization problem for the entrepreneur and a different resulting







s.t. eNN = ωRNNe (ICe)
piωeNN(R−RNNe ) ≥ I (PCV C)
τωeNN(R−RNNe ) < C (ICV C ex ante)
G+ keNN(R−RNNe ) ≤ ωeNN(R−RNNe ) (ICV C ex post)
The solution to P4 is described in the following lemma.










. The optimal contract is determined by the largest root of the
following equation:













. The optimal contract is the largest value such that
ICV C ex post is binding:
(ω − k)ωRNNe (R−RNNe ) = G
The optimal contract will entail a fee ex ante if the VC participation constraint is slack. The
problem has a solution only when conditions piω
2R2
4
≥ I and G ≤ 1
4
(ω − k)ωR2 are satisfied.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 4 shows that there are two cases of interest. Both require the cost of advice C to
be relatively high, to deter inward knowledge transfer by the VC. In the first case, the venture
capitalist’s private benefit from expropriation G is sufficiently low not to tempt him, given his
stake in the financial returns of the entrepreneur’s project (required to satisfy his participation
constraint). In the second case, the private benefit from expropriation is larger, and the VC has
to be offered a higher share of financial returns to ensure he does not expropriate. Thus in the
first case, the optimal contract with the VC is the same as with the non-VC investor, and the
entrepreneur is indifferent between raising external finance from a VC or a non-VC investor. In
the second case, the optimal contract with the VC differs from the one with the non-VC investor
because of the binding ex-post incentive constraint for the VC: in this case, the entrepreneur will
prefer to raise funding from a non-VC investor.
3.2.5 Choice of contract under VC finance
Using the results summarized by Lemmas 1 to 4, we can study the entrepreneur’s optimal choice
of contract when he raises external finance from a venture capitalist. We will then be able to
examine the tradeoffs involved in obtaining funding from a VC relative to a non-VC investor.
Optimal VC contracts have the following properties:
• intuitively, when the cost of inward knowledge transfer is low (so low that the VC ex-
ante incentive constraint is never binding), the optimal contract always induces this form
of transfer. In addition, it also induces outward knowledge transfer if, and only if, the
spillover benefits G are above a critical threshold value.
• when the cost of inward knowledge transfer is higher, we find that
1. for intermediate values of the spillover benefits G, the optimal contract induces ei-
ther outward knowledge transfer (with a low financial stake for the VC), or inward
knowledge transfer (with a higher financial stake for the VC);
2. for higher values of G, the optimal contract induces both inward and outward knowl-
edge transfer.
More formally, the following result describes the optimal choice of contract under VC finance.





, the optimal contract will always induce the VC to transfer knowledge ex ante.






– when G > G∗, the optimal contract will be the one that induces knowledge transfer ex
ante and ex post;
















– when G > G∗∗, the optimal contract will always induce the VC to transfer knowledge
ex post. For C
τ
below a cutoff value, the contract will also induce the VC to transfer
knowledge ex ante.
– when G∗∗ ≥ G > G∗∗∗, the optimal contract will either induce knowledge transfer ex
ante or it will induce knowledge transfer ex post (depending on the magnitude of C
τ
,
G, k and ω).
– when G < G∗∗∗, the optimal contract may induce knowledge transfer ex ante or ex post,
or no knowledge transfer. For lower values of G, there will be no ex post knowledge
transfer.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for the second part of Proposition 1 is as follows. When the spillover benefit G is
sufficiently high, the optimal contract will always induce expropriation; it may also induce advice
provided the advice cost is not too high. Conversely, when the spillover benefit is sufficiently low,
the optimal contract will never induce expropriation; it may again induce advice provided the
advice cost is not too high. For intermediate values of G, two possibilities emerge. The optimal
contract may entail advice without expropriation: inducing the VC to transfer knowledge ex ante
means he has to be given a relatively high share of financial returns, which deters expropriation
ex post, given that the private benefit from expropriation is not so large. Alternatively, the
optimal contract may entail expropriation without advice: this implies that the VC is given a
relatively low share of financial returns, which leads him to transfer knowledge ex post, but does
not induce him to advise ex ante. Thus for intermediate values of G, the two forms of knowledge
transfer are substitutes. They become complements for higher values of G: the anticipation
of spillover benefits then induces the VC to advise, while advice increases the probability of a
successful innovation and hence also spillover benefits.
3.2.6 Choosing between VC and non-VC finance
We can now study the trade-offs faced by the entrepreneur in choosing between VC and non-VC
finance. Our analysis reveals that:
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• when the cost of inward knowledge transfer is lower than a critical threshold,
(i) either VC finance is always preferred,
(ii) or the choice between VC and non-VC finance is non-monotonic in the spillover benefit
G: VC finance is preferred for higher and lower G, while non-VC finance is preferred for
intermediate G.
• when the cost of inward knowledge transfer is higher, VC finance is preferred if, and only
if, the spillover benefit G is above a critical threshold.
The intuition for the non-monotonicity property is straightforward: relying on VC finance
entails a cost when expropriation is inefficient but may nevertheless be tempting for the VC,
since he bears only part of the cost (the remainder is borne by the entrepreneur). This occurs for
intermediate values of G. The optimal VC contract may either allow inefficient expropriation, or
deter such expropriation - at a cost (the distortionary effect on entrepreneurial effort due to the
need to increase the VC financial stake in the venture). Non-VC finance may then be preferred.
Formally, the optimal choice between VC and non-VC finance is summarized by the following
result, and described in detail in the Appendix.
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Gˇ < G¨, such that for G < Gˇ, case III is the optimal choice, while when G > Gˇ, case
II is preferred.
2. when µ < µ˙, we have: for G < G¨, VC finance (case III) is preferred. For G¨ < G <
...
G,
Non-VC finance is preferred. And for G >
...
G,VC finance (case II) is preferred. The
threshold
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, there is a threshold, G1, such that Non-VC finance is preferred for






, there are two cutoff values, G2 and G3, with G3 > G2, such that
VC finance (case III) is preferred for G 6 G2, non-VC finance is preferred for G2 <




Thus when the cost of ex ante knowledge transfer is sufficiently high, the entrepreneur will
prefer non-VC finance as long as the benefit from ex post knowledge transfer is below a threshold
value, and otherwise he will prefer VC finance. When the cost of ex ante knowledge transfer is
lower, on the other hand, two possibilities emerge: either the entrepreneur always chooses VC
finance, or there will be a non-monotonic relationship between financing choice and G, in the
sense that non-VC finance is preferred for intermediate values of G, while VC finance is preferred
for higher or lower values of G.
4 Patentable innovations and the decision to seek patent
protection
In this section, we extend the analysis to patentable innovations. We incorporate a crucial feature
of the way patent systems work in practice: typically there is some uncertainty as to whether
a patent application will be successful, even for commercially valuable innovations. Moreover,
the patent application itself often reveals information that may be beneficial to competitors. We
model this by assuming that, following the development of a valuable innovation, the entrepreneur
can apply for a patent: this application will be approved with probability β < 1. The parameter
β > 0 captures the efficiency of the patent system, industry characteristics, and the characteristics
of the innovation. We also assume that, if the patent application is rejected, the leakage of
information from the patenting application increases the probability of subsequent expropriation
by competitors from µ to α, with 1 > α > µ. This assumption is motivated by empirical
evidence from the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey: Graham, Merges, Samuelson and Sichelman
(2010) analyze the responses from 1332 early stage companies founded since 1998 and find that
35% cite ”Did not want to disclose information” as a reason for not seeking patent protection
for their innovations21. If a patent is granted, there are two possibilities. Either the patent is
used to exclude competitors: in this case the entrepreneur’s project succeeds with probability
e. Alternatively, the intellectual property can be licensed: this yields revenue L > G for the
firm, while the project succeeds with reduced probability ke. This captures the idea that private
knowledge transfer by the VC may yield a lower benefit than licensing, as it cannot be done
through an explicit legal contract.
Our main interest in what follows is to explore the decision to seek patent protection, and
how it differs depending on whether the entrepreneur raises external finance from a VC or a non-
VC investor. For simplicity, this part of the analysis abstracts from ex-ante (inward) knowledge
21The survey highlights substantial differences across industries, with the proportion of respondents citing
information disclosure as a reason not to seek patent protection varying from 59% in biotechnology to 25% in
software.
19




Innovation is realized? Apply
for patent? If patent granted,





transfer, and focuses on ex-post (outward) knowledge transfer by the VC, which is the one
directly affected (ruled out) when the innovation is protected by a patent. We bring back inward
knowledge transfer later, when we examine the use of contingencies in venture capital contracts.
The timing of the model is illustrated in Figure 2.
4.1 Non-VC investor
We begin by studying optimal contracts between the entrepreneur and a non-VC investor. We
examine each of the two cases of interest: first, the case where the patent is used to exclude
competitors and no entry occurs. Second, the case where the entrepreneur licenses the patented
innovation.
4.1.1 Non-VC investor: patent used to exclude competitors
When the firm chooses to use the patent to exclude competitors, the effort level exerted by the
entrepreneur following patent approval is given by eP = argmaxe eR
P
e − 12e2, and in case of
patent rejection it is eR = argmaxe ezR
R
e − 12e2, where z ≡ 1−α+αk. The first order conditions
give us: eP = RPe , e













s.t. pi{βeP (R−RPe ) + (1− β)eRz(R−RRe )} ≥ I (PCi)
eP = RPe , e
R = zRRe (ICe)
The solution to P5 is described by Lemma 5.
Lemma 5 The optimal contract satisfies RPe = R
R
e = Rˆ, and Rˆ is the largest root of pi[β + (1−
β)z2]Rˆ(R− Rˆ) = I provided that I ≤ R2
4
pi[β + (1− β)z2].
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Proof. See Appendix.
4.1.2 Non-VC investor: licensing
When the firm licenses its intellectual property, the probability of project success decreases from
e to ke. Therefore, the effort level of the entrepreneur following patent approval is altered:
eL = argmaxekeR
L
e − 12e2 = kRLe . The effort level in case of patent rejection is unchanged, i.e.,
eR = zRRe .
We can see that in general it is optimal to allocate all the license revenue L to the investor,
since this relaxes his participation constraint, making it possible to maximize the share of the
final project return given to the entrepreneur, which induces higher entrepreneurial effort. The
two channels through which the licensing decision affects the entrepreneur’s payoff are: on the one
hand, licensing reduces the probability of project success, which decreases the expected payoff
of the entrepreneur; on the other hand, licensing relaxes the investor’s participation constraint,
giving a higher share of the final returns to the entrepreneur, which increases his expected return.
















2 + (1− β)(zRRe )2]
s.t. pi{β[k2RLe (R−RLe ) + L] + (1− β)z2RRe (R−RRe )} ≥ I
The solution to P6 is given by Lemma 6.
Lemma 6 When L = I
piβ
, the optimal contract is RLe = R
R
e = R, and the VC earns the license
fee L. When L < I
piβ





R is the largest root of pi(βk2 + (1 − β)z2) ˆˆR(R − ˆˆR) = I − piβL; 3. The condition I ≤
piR2
4
(βk2 + (1 − β)z2) + piβL must be satisfied. When L > I
piβ
, the investor is willing to provide
more initial capital than the required amount I, i.e., I+Z = Lpiβ, where Z denotes the difference
between the initial investment I and the investor’s initial capital contribution.
Proof. See Appendix.
4.1.3 The patenting decision with non-VC finance
Comparing Lemma 6 with Lemma 5, we see that if the license fee L were reduced to zero, using
the patent to exclude competitors would clearly be preferred, since the benefit from licensing
disappears, while the project’s probability of success is reduced by licensing. As L increases,
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the entrepreneur’s expected utility from the licensing contract increases monotonically, while the
expected utility from the patent to exclude competitors contract is unchanged. Thus for L above
some threshold value, the entrepreneur’s preference switches in favor of the licensing contract.
Comparing Lemma 5 with our earlier results for non-VC finance without patents, we also see
that there is a clear trade-off between applying for a patent with which to exclude competitors,
and not applying for a patent at all. Specifically, it is optimal to apply for a patent to exclude
competitors only if the expected benefit from applying for the patent, due to the ability to
protect the innovation if the patent is approved, outweighs the expected cost, due to information
disclosure (i.e., β + (1− β)z2 > ω2).
The following result describes the entrepreneur’s optimal choice between the three possible
options with non-VC finance: apply for a patent and, if approved, use it to exclude competitors;
apply for a patent and, if approved, license the innovation; do not apply for patent protection.
Proposition 3 There exist two cutoff values LN and LP ,22 such that LP > LN > L∗, where
L∗ = (1−k
2)I
pi[β+(1−β)z2] is the licensing value such that
ˆˆ
R = Rˆ, and:
1. When β + (1 − β)z2 > ω2, it is optimal to apply for a patent. When L ≤ LN , it is also
optimal to use the patent to exclude competitors, while when L ≥ LN , it is optimal to
license.
2. When β + (1 − β)z2 < ω2, applying for a patent and licensing is preferred if L > LP .
Otherwise, if L < LP , it is optimal not to apply for a patent.
Proof. See Appendix.
The tradeoffs described by the Proposition are illustrated in Figure 3.
4.2 VC investor
The entrepreneur’s choice is somewhat more complicated when he raises external finance from
a venture capitalist, and is studied below. There are in principle six possible options: (1) apply
for a patent, use it to exclude competitors if the patent is approved; otherwise induce the VC to
transfer knowledge; (2) apply for a patent, use it to exclude competitors if the patent is approved;
otherwise induce the VC not to transfer knowledge; (3) apply for a patent, license if the patent
is approved; otherwise induce the VC to transfer knowledge; (4) apply for a patent, license if the
patent is approved; otherwise induce the VC not to transfer knowledge; (5) do not apply for a
patent; induce the VC to transfer knowledge; (6) do not apply for a patent; induce the VC not
to transfer knowledge. However, the options where the VC does not transfer knowledge yield the
same outcome in terms of knowledge transfer as non-VC finance, and a lower expected utility for
22The values of LN and LP are given in the appendix.
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Figure 3: Patent and License Decision
β + (1− β)z2 = ω2
β + (1− β)z2 < ω2












the entrepreneur if the VC incentive constraint (ensuring that he does not transfer knowledge)
is binding. Thus non-VC finance is preferred. Without loss of generality, we can therefore focus
on the three options that entail knowledge transfer by the VC.
For expositional convenience we assume that G < I
pi
, i.e., the expected gain from expropriation
would never be sufficient, on its own, to induce the VC to fund the entrepreneur, and similarly
L < I
pi
,implying that the licensing fee is not enough to recover all the investment cost of the
project.23.
4.2.1 VC investor: Patent used to exclude competitors
When the patent is used to exclude competitors, the entrepreneur’s effort level will be eP =
argmaxe eR
V P
e − 12e2 = RV Pe if the patent is granted, and eR = argmaxe ekRV Re − 12e2 = kRV Re
if the patent is rejected, since in the latter case the VC will expropriate.
23These assumptions reduce the number of cases to be considered, without affecting the main insights from our
results.
23












s.t. eP = RV Pe , e
R = kRV Re (ICe)
pi{βeP (R−RV Pe ) + (1− β)[eRk(R−RV Re ) +G]} ≥ I (PCV C)
G+ keR(R−RV Re ) ≥ zeR(R−RV Re ) (ICV C)
The solution to problem (P7) is given by Lemma 7.













• when G ≥ C2, the optimal contract specifies RV Pe = RV Re = ˆˆR, where ˆˆR is the largest value
such that PCV C is binding;
• when C2 > G ≥ C3, the optimal contract specifies RˆV Re > RˆV Pe , where RˆV Re is the largest




e is the largest value such that PCV C
is binding;
• when G < C3, it is not possible to induce the VC to participate and transfer knowledge.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 7 tells us that if the expropriation benefit G is large enough, then it is optimal to
give the entrepreneur the same share of final returns if the patent is granted and if the patent
is rejected; this share is determined by the binding participation constraint for the VC. As G
decreases, the incentive constraint of the VC can no longer be satisfied. Therefore, the share
of returns going to the VC when the patent is rejected needs to be reduced, while his share
of returns when the patent is approved increases to satisfy the participation constraint as an
equality. Finally if G is too low, it is not possible to induce the venture capitalist to participate
and transfer knwoledge.
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4.2.2 VC investor: licensing

















s.t. eL = kRV Le , e
R = kRV Re (ICe)
pi{β[L+ keL(R−RV Le )] + (1− β)[G+ keR(R−RV Re )]} ≥ I (PCV C)
G ≥ (z − k)kRV Re (R−RV Re ) (ICV C)
The solution to (P8) is summarized in Lemma 8.





when G ≥ H2, it is optimal to specify the same share of returns for the entrepreneur when
the patent is granted or rejected, determined as the largest share that satisfies the binding VC
participation constraint;
when H2 > G ≥ H3, it is optimal to set RV Re > RV Le . Here RV Re is the largest value such that
ICV C is binding; while R
V L
e is the value such that PCV C is binding given R
V R
e ;
when G < H3, it is not possible to induce the VC to participate and expropriate.
Proof. See Appendix.
4.2.3 The patenting decision with VC finance
We first investigate the decision to apply for patent protection under VC finance:
Lemma 9 Under VC finance, it is always optimal to apply for patent protection.
Proof. See Appendix.
We now examine the entrepreneur’s choice between licensing and excluding competitors when
a patent is granted. This is described by the following result.
Lemma 10 When VC finance is obtained and a patent is granted, the choice between licensing
and excluding competitors is determined as follows.
(i) if H2 > G ≥ C2, the patent is used to exclude competitors;
(ii) if C2 > G ≥ H2, the patent is licensed;
(iii) if G ≥ max{C2, H2}, there is a cutoff value L#, where L# > Lˆ ≡ (1−k2)[I−(1−β)piG]pi[β+(1−β)k2] , such
that the patent is licensed when L > L# and used to exclude competitors otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix.
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4.3 The decision to seek patent protection
It is clear from our analysis so far that the decision to seek patent protection differs depending on
whether the entrepreneur is financed by a venture capitalist or a non-VC investor. In particular,
we have shown that:
(i) it is always optimal to apply for patent protection under VC finance;
(ii) it can be optimal not to apply for patent protection under non-VC finance. This will
be the case if, and only if, the expected benefit from applying, due to the ability to protect the
innovation from expropriation if the patent is approved, is lower than the expected cost, due to
information disclosure.
This difference means that, holding the probability of a successful innovation constant (here
exogenously equal to pi), we should expect to see a greater propensity to patent among VC-
funded firms. Interestingly, this is not due to entrepreneurs’ fear of being expropriated by their
VC investors: the result in our model is driven instead by the reluctance of non-VC-funded
firms to apply for patent protection when there is sufficient uncertainty over the outcome of the
application, combined with information disclosure that makes expropriation by competitors more
likely if the patent application is unsuccessful. This reluctance is not shared by VC-funded firms,
since they can rely on the venture capitalist to transfer knowledge profitably when the patent
application is rejected, pre-emptying subsequent expropriation by competitors. Moreover, the
venture capitalists’ expected gains from such transfers are taken into account at the contracting
stage, relaxing financing constraints so that entrepreneurs who would otherwise be denied funding
can obtain the external finance needed to undertake their projects. This result is consistent with
the finding by Mollica and Zingales (2007) that venture capital firms tend to increase both patents
and the number of new businesses.
4.4 Contingencies in venture capital contracts
Our analysis of patentable innovations so far has shown that in general optimal VC contracts
will not condition the share of financial returns going to the VC (entrepreneur) on whether a
patent is granted or not. There is one important exception: this occurs when the VC incentive
constraint is binding. It is interesting then to extend our analysis to study the implications
for the use of contingencies in venture capital contracts. To do this, we investigate the form of
optimal VC contracts when innovations are patentable, allowing for both forms of knowledge
transfer. In the interest of brevity, we simply summarize here our key findings. Details of all the
results and proofs are given in the Appendix. Optimal VC contracts for patentable innovations
have the following properties:
• in general, the share of final returns going to the VC (entrepreneur) is not contingent on
patent approval;
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• for some parameter values, however, the VC ex post incentive constraint will be binding:
in this case, contracts will be contingent on patent approval. Specifically,
1. when the contract induces outward knowledge transfer (with or without inward knowl-
edge transfer), the share of final returns going to the VC (entrepreneur) will be higher
(lower) when a patent is granted;
2. when the contract induces inward knowledge transfer without outward knowledge
transfer, the share of final returns going to the VC (entrepreneur) will be lower (higher)
when a patent is granted.
However, it can be verified that when the VC ex post incentive constraint is binding, the
following holds:
(1) the optimal VC contract with outward knowledge transfer (and no inward transfer) is
dominated by non-VC finance;
(2) the optimal VC contract with both outward and inward knowledge transfer is dominated
by the optimal VC contract with only inward knowledge transfer.
Thus in equilibrium we can expect to observe two types of VC contract: contracts that are
not contingent on patent approval, and (less frequently) contracts that offer a lower (higher)
share of final returns to the VC (entrepreneur) when a patent is granted. As discussed in the
Introduction, this is consistent with the evidence presented by Kaplan and Stromberg (2003).
4.5 Robustness and extensions
Our results on the decision to apply for patent protection were obtained, for tractability as well
as ease of exposition, under the assumption that the VC could only engage in ex-post knowledge
transfer, or equivalently that the cost C of ex-ante knowledge transfer was very high. Allowing
for a lower cost C can modify our analysis in two ways. First, if the spillover benefit G is low,
VC finance may nevertheless be preferred, with the optimal VC contract designed to induce
knowledge transfer ex ante, but not ex post. In this case, the decision to apply for a patent
under VC finance is based on the same trade-off as under non-VC finance, namely the trade-off
between protection against expropriation by competitors if the patent is granted, and a higher
probability of expropriation by competitors if the patent is not granted, because of information
disclosure. Second, for higher values of G, VC finance may be preferred with contracts inducing
both forms of knowledge transfer. In this case, the patenting decision under VC finance remains
the same as above; i.e. it remains optimal to always apply for patent protection following a
successful innovation.
An interesting extension of our analysis is to consider the case where k > 1. Transferring
knowledge to other firms in this case leaves the entrepreneur’s probability of success unaffected,
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or better still, it increases his chances of success. This case is not without practical interest: for
example, there can be circumstances when transmitting private knowledge to other firms helps
to generate new complementary products and services and profitable opportunities. Financing
and patenting decisions then become very straightforward: the entrepreneur will always prefer
VC finance, and under VC finance it will always be optimal to apply for a patent following the
development of a successful innovation (as long as L > G).
5 Conclusions
This paper has studied the role of venture capitalists as knowledge intermediaries. We focused
exclusively on this role because it has been under-researched until now, and yet the limited
empirical evidence available so far suggests it is important. Indeed, we view our model as a first
step towards understanding its implications for financing constraints and new business creation,
for innovation, and for product market competition, leading to promising empirical research.
There is also much theoretical analysis of venture capitalists to be done in the future, notably
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6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. From PCV C and ICV C ex ante, we can see that
C
τ






From ICV C ex post and PCV C , we have
G ≥ (ω − k)eV N(R−RV Ne )














If G ≥ I
pi
, PCV C can be satisfied easily by setting R
V N
e = R, which maximizes the expected
payoffs to the entrepreneur. When the inequality holds strictly, the VC will make an additional
payment F ex ante, beyond I, so that the participation constraint holds as an equality; i.e.




If G < I
pi
, as the participation constraint will be binding in optimum, the optimal contract,
RV Ne , is determined by the largest root of the following equation: pi[k
2RV Ne (R−RV Ne ) +G] = I.




6.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. To induce VC to transfer knowledge ex post, it implies that
G ≥ (ω − k)kRV Ne (R−RV Ne ) (1)
(from ICV C ex post). By rewriting PCV C and ICV C ex ante, we have














Combining these two inequalities, we have










Substitute the above inequality into the expression (1), we have














}, it is not possible to induce the VC to transfer
knowledge ex post.




}, the optimal contract
is RV Ne = R. In this case, ICV C ex post is always satisfied. PCV C and ICV C ex ante are also
satisfied as inequality (2) holds as well. If PCV C is slack, the VC needs to pay an additional fee
ex ante F = (pi + τ)[k2RV Ne (R − RV Ne ) + G] − I − C = (pi + τ)G − I − C to the entrepreneur











}, ICV C ex post is always satisfied. Expression
(2) must be binding, which implies that either PCV C or ICV C ex post will be binding in optimum,








, then PCV C will be binding; and





, such that the participation constraint of VC is slack, then VC would pay an
extra fee ex ante, F, to the entrepreneur such that (pi + τ)[keV N(R − RV Ne ) + G] = I + C + F .
VCs always earn zero expected rents as they are competitive.
The participation constraint under which VC will invest in the project could be rewritten as:










k2R2 +G] ≥ I + C. 
6.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Similar to the Proof of Lemma 2, from PCV C and ICV C ex ante , we have







From ICV C ex post, we have
G ≤ (ω − k)ωRV Ne (R−RV Ne ) (4)
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If expression (4) holds with inequality, then at optimum, expression (3) must hold with equality,







}. In this case, either PCV C or ICV C ex ante is binding, depending on the








, ICV C ex ante is binding and PCV C is slack;
vice versa. ) When the VC participation constraint is slack, then VC would pay an extra fee
ex ante, F, to the entrepreneur such that (pi + τ)ωeV N(R − RV Ne ) = I + C + F . VCs always
earn zero expected rents as they are competitive. The optimal contract is the largest root of the







} as RV Ne (R−RV Ne ) ≤ 14R2.







}. The optimal contract is the largest root of the following equation:
G = (ω − k)ωRV Ne (R−RV Ne ).
The problem has a solution only when G ≤ 1
4
(ω − k)ωR2. In this case, V CPC may also be slack
and therefore VC would pay an extra fee ex ante to the entrepreneur, F = (pi+ τ) ω
ω−kG− I −C
such that participation constraint is binding.
6.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Condition PCV C and ICV C ex ante implies that
C
τ









If ICV C ex post holds with inequality, it implies that G < (ω − k)ωRNNe (R − RNNe ). Then
at optimum, RNNe should be as large as possible, which implies that ωe
NN(R − RNNe ) should
be as small as possible. Therefore, PCV C is binding while ICV C ex ante is slack at optimum.
Substitute ωeNN(R−RNNe ) = Ipi into ICV C ex post, we have G < ω−kω Ipi . In short, we can say that




, the optimal contract exists, which is the largest root of piω2RNNe (R−RNNe ) = I.






If ICV C ex post holds with equality, it implies that G = (ω−k)ωRNNe (R−RNNe ). Substitute
it into PCV C , we have G ≥ ω−kω Ipi . In this case, the optimal contract is the largest value such that
ICV C ex post is binding. The condition for the range of G must be satisfied: G ≤ 14(ω− k)ωR2.
In this case, if PCV C is slack, then VC would pay an ex ante fee F =
piωG
ω−k −I to the entrepreneur
such that his expected rent is zero, similar to the above situations.
6.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. By plugging in ICe into the objective function and PCi, the optimization problem for
















s.t. pi[βRPe (R−RPe ) + (1− β)z2RRe (R−RRe )] ≥ I (PCi)









2] + λ{pi[βRPe (R−RPe ) + (1− β)z2RRe (R−RRe )]− I}
The first order conditions are:
∂L
∂RPe
= piβRPe + λpiβ(R− 2RPe ) = 0 (5)
∂L
∂RRe
= pi(1− β)z2RRe + λpi(1− β)z2(R− 2RRe ) = 0 (6)
∂L
∂λ
= pi[βRPe (R−RPe ) + (1− β)z2RRe (R−RRe )]− I = 0 (7)







Equation (8) finally gives us
RPe = R
R
e = Rˆ (9)
Combine (9) and (7), the participation constraint of non-VC investor can be simplified as
pi[β + (1− β)z2]Rˆ(R− Rˆ)] = I (10)
The largest root of equation (10) is the optimal payment to the entrepreneur when facing non-VC
and patent protection without license.
As we all know that Rˆ ∈ [0, R], then Rˆ(R − Rˆ) ≤ R2
4
. And from (10), we have I ≤
R2
4
pi[β + (1− β)z2].
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6.6 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. The Lagrangien function for the problem (P2) can be written as
L = βk2(RLe )
2 + (1− β)(zRRe )2 + λ{
I
pi
− β[L+ k2RLe (R−RLe )]− (1− β)z2RRe (R−RRe )}
The first order conditions give us:
∂L
∂RLe
= 2βk2RLe − λβk2(R− 2RLe ) = 0 (11)
∂L
∂RRe






− βL− βk2RLe (R−RLe )− (1− β)z2RRe (R−RRe ) ≤ 0 (13)
1. When piβL ≥ I ⇐⇒ L ≥ I
piβ
;
Then it’s possible to set RLe = R
R
e = R and still satisfy the investor’s participation con-
straint; If the condition holds as a strictly inequality, the investor can provide additional
capital ex ante above I, i.e., L = I+Z
piβ
, where Z denotes the difference between the initial
investment and the willingness to fund of VC as VC market is competitive. Therefore,
investor’s PC will always be binding and the initial investment becomes I + Z.
2. When piβL < I ⇐⇒ L < I
piβ
;







λ(1− β)z2(R− 2RRe )
=⇒ RLe = RRe
Let RLe = R
R




s.t. pi(βk2 + (1− β)z2) ˆˆR(R− ˆˆR) = I − piβL
So it has a solution iff
piR2
4
(βk2 + (1− β)z2) ≥ I − piβL








R is the largest root
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of (βk2 + (1− β)z2) ˆˆR(R− ˆˆR) = I
pi
− βL.
6.7 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. Suppose at optimum, ICV C is always satisfied. Since PCV C must be binding, the similar





R(R− ˆˆR) = Ipi−(1−β)G
β+(1−β)k2 . Plug it into ICV C , we have [β+(1−β)k2]G ≥ (z−k)k[ Ipi−(1−β)G]
=⇒ [β + (1− β)k2 + (1− β)(z − k)k]G ≥ (z − k)k I
pi
.
Therefore, we could discuss optimal contract by the following cases:
1. If pi(1 − β)G ≥ I, it’s possible to set RV Pe = RV Re = R and it satisfies PCV C and ICV C .
However, due to our assumption that G < I
pi
, we will ignore this case in our analysis.
2. If pi(1 − β)G < I, and G[β + (1 − β)zk] ≥ (z − k)k I
pi
























, the PCV C and ICV C are both binding. The optimal
contract is RˆV Pe and Rˆ
V R
e , where Rˆ
V R
e is the largest root of G = (z−k)kRˆV Re (R−RˆV Re ). And
given RˆV Re , Rˆ
V P
e is the largest root of pi{βRˆV Pe (R−RˆV Pe )+(1−β)[G+k2RˆV Re (R−RˆV Re )]} = I.
It’s easy to see that RˆV Re ≥ RˆV Pe since when G become smaller than k(z−k)β+(1−β)kz Ipi , we must
give the entrepreneur higher share of return in case of patent rejection such that the ICV C
could be easily satisfied. Therefore, RˆV Re ≥ RˆV Pe .






βR2], it’s not possible to induce the VC to participate and expropriate.
Because if the maximum possible level of RV Pe ,
R
2
, together with the maximum feasible
level of RV Re that satisfies the IVV C , are not sufficient to satisfy the PCV C , i.e., if






+ (1− β)[G+ k2 G
(z − k)k <
I
pi







In this case, the optimal contract is the same as the non-VC case.
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6.8 Proof of Lemma 8
Proof.
1. Suppose pi[βL+ (1− β)G] ≥ I, then we can set RV Le = RV Re = R, PCV C and ICV C are all
satisfied. Note that we assume that L < I
pi
, G < I
pi
, therefore, this case is ruled out.






2 + (1− β)(RV Re )2]
+λ{ I
pi
− β[L+ k2RV Le (R−RV Le )]− (1− β)[G+ k2RV Re (R−RV Re )]}
For interior solution, we have
∂L
∂RV Le
= pik2βRV Le − λβk2(R− 2RV Le ) = 0
∂L
∂RV Re






β(R− 2RV Le )
(1− β)(R− 2RV Re )





s.t. βL+ (1− β)G+ k2 ˆˆRV (R− ˆˆRV ) ≥ I
pi
=⇒ k2 ˆˆRV (R− ˆˆRV ) ≥ I
pi
− βL− (1− β)G





− βL − (1 − β)G. If this condition holds, and ICV C






RV is the largest root of
k2
ˆˆ
RV (R− ˆˆRV ) = I
pi
−βL−(1−β)G, plug it into ICV C , we have G ≥ z−kk [ Ipi−βL−(1−β)G],
i.e., G[1 + z−k
k

















RV Le , s.t.
ˆˆ
RV Re is the largest root of G = (z − k)kRV Re (R − RV Re ), ˆˆRV Le is the largest
root of βL+ (1− β)G+ k2[βRV Le (R−RV Le ) + (1− β) ˆˆRV Re (R− ˆˆRV Re )] = Ipi given ˆˆRV Re . It’s
easy to see that
ˆˆ
RV Re ≥ ˆˆRV Le since when G become smaller than z−kβk+(1−β)z [ Ipi −βL], we must
38
give the entrepreneur higher share of return in case of patent rejection such that the ICV C
could be easily satisfied. Therefore,
ˆˆ
RV Re ≥ ˆˆRV Le .
4. Finally, it’s not possible to induce the VC to participate and expropriate if the maximum
possible level of RV Le ,
1
2
R, together with the maximum feasible level of RV Re that satisfies
the ICV C , are not together sufficient to satisfy the PCV C , i.e., if
βL+ (1− β)G+ k2[βR
2
4
+ (1− β) G
k(z − k) ] <
I
pi
=⇒ (1− β)G[1 + k
2














6.9 Proof of Lemma 9
The proof is straightforward. We are interested in the case where VC finance is chosen. If
no patent application is made, the VC is induced to transfer knowledge ex post. If a patent
application is made, it is always possible to do at least as well by licensing when the patent is
granted (since L > G) and by inducing the VC to transfer knowledge when the patent is not
granted.
6.10 Proof of Lemma 10
Proof. We focus on the case where VC finance is obtained; i.e. it is preferred to non-VC finance.
This implies G ≥ C2 and/or G ≥ H2. To see this, note that when the patent is used to exclude
competitors, non-VC finance is preferred for G < C2: specifically, for G < C3 it is not possible
to induce the VC to participate and transfer knowledge (hence, there is no difference between
VC and non-VC finance), while for C2 > G ≥ C3, non-VC finance is preferred.24
Similarly, when the patent is licensed, non-VC finance is preferred for G < H2: specifically,
for G < H3 it is not possible to induce the VC to participate and transfer knowledge (hence,
there is no difference between VC and non-VC finance), while for H2 > G ≥ H3 the VC incentive
constraint is binding, implying that non-VC finance is preferred. Clearly then if G ≥ C2 and
24Consider problem P7, C2 > G ≥ C3. Let the solution be S, V , where S is given by G = (z−k)kS(R−S), and
then V is given by βV (R−V )+(1−β)[k2S(R−S)+G] = Ipi . These two conditions imply βV (R−V )+(1−β)zkS(R−
S) = Ipi . The participation constraint for non-VC finance can be written as βV (R−V ) + (1−β)z2S(R−S) > Ipi ,
implying that for the same values of S and V (the ones that solve problem P7) the constraint is slack, since
z2 > zk. Moreover, the expected utility for the VC contract is UV C = pi{β V 22 + (1 − β)k
2S2
2 }, while for the
non-VC contract it is UNV C = pi{β V 22 + (1− β) z
2S2
2 }. Since z2 > k2, we have UNV C > UV C .
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G < H2 there will be no licensing under VC finance; similarly, if G < C2 and G ≥ H2 the patent
will not be used to exclude competitors under VC finance.
When G ≥ max{C2, H2}, the optimal contracts are the largest root of the following equations,
for patent and no license : [β + (1− β)k2] ˆˆR(R− ˆˆR) = I
pi
− (1− β)G
for patent and license : k2
ˆˆ
RV (R− ˆˆRV ) = I
pi











, the optimal contracts with and without licensing
provide the same share of final returns to the entrepreneur, that is, L = (1−k
2)[I−(1−β)piG]
pi[β+(1−β)k2] ≡ Lˆ.
The condition G ≥ max{C2, H2} implies that
G ≥ k(z − k)




G ≥ z − k




where L = Lˆ. Inequality (14) implies that
G ≥ z − k
βk + (1− β)z
I
pi
− (z − k)β




β + (1− β)k2 ,
which gives us
G ≥ (z − k)k
2




Therefore, as long as
G ≥ max{C2, H2(L = Lˆ)}
= max{ k(z − k)









i.e., G ∈ Φ, where Φ = [max{C2, H2(L = Lˆ)},+∞) then when L = Lˆ, the optimal contracts
with and without licensing provide the same share of final returns to the entrepreneur, while
the licensing contract implies a lower success probability, thus the contract without licensing is
preferred.
Then we have
UP (G ≥ max{C2, H2(L = Lˆ)}) > UPL(G ≥ max{C2, H2(L = Lˆ)})
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Cases Contract Equation Condition for I,G
I. Outward k2RV Ne (R−RV Ne ) +G = Ipi (e) Ipi > G ≥ ω−kω Ipi (o)
knowledge transfer RV Ne = R (r) G ≥ Ipi (m)
II. Inward and outward k2RV Ne (R−RV Ne ) +G = max{Cτ , I+Cpi+τ } (a) max{Cτ , I+Cpi+τ } > G ≥ ω−kω max{Cτ , I+Cpi+τ }
knowledge transfer RV Ne = R (b) G ≥ max{Cτ , I+Cpi+τ }
III. Inward ω2RV Ne (R−RV Ne ) = max{Cτ , I+Cpi+τ } (c) G < ω−kω max{Cτ , I+Cpi+τ }
knowledge transfer (ω − k)ωRV Ne (R−RV Ne ) = G (d) G ≥ ω−kω max{Cτ , I+Cpi+τ }
IV. No ω2RNNe (R−RNNe ) = Ipi (f) G < ω−kω Ipi (p)
knowledge transfer (ω − k)ωRNNe (R−RNNe ) = G (g) G ≥ ω−kω Ipi (q)
Cases Condition for I,G Utility F
I.Outward pi[ 14k
2R2 +G] ≥ I& Ipi ≤ Cτ (k) U1 = pi2 k2(RV Ne )2
knowledge transfer Ipi ≤ Cτ (n) U1 = pi2 k2(RV Ne )2 + F F = piG− I
II. Inward and outward (pi + τ)[ 14k
2R2 +G] ≥ I + C (i) U2 = (pi+τ)2 k2(RV Ne )2 F = (pi + τ)[k2RV Ne (R−RV Ne )
+F · 1{Cτ > Ipi} +G]− I − C




2 + F F = (pi + τ)G− I − C
III. Inward 14ω
2R2 ≥ max{Cτ , I+Cpi+τ } (j) U3 = (pi+τ)2 ω2(RV Ne )2 F = (pi + τ)ω2RV Ne (R−RV Ne )
+F · 1{Cτ > Ipi} −I − C
knowledge transfer G ≤ 14 (ω − k)ωR2 U3 = (pi+τ)2 ω2(RV Ne )2 + F F = (pi + τ) ωω−kG− I − C
IV. No piω
2R2
















= 0. Therefore, there exists a cutoff value L#, where L# > Lˆ, such that
when L > L#, UPL > UP .
6.11 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The optimal contracts for VC-finance with non-patentable knowledge in different cases
are listed in the above table. For simplification, in what follows, we will refer to ”Outward
knowledge transfer”, ”Inward and outward knowledge transfer”, ”Inward knowledge transfer”,
and ”No knowledge transfer” as Case I, Case II, Case III, and Case IV, respectively. We will
















, Cases I & IV will not happen. We
therefore need to consider the choice between Case II and Case III.




, we have to compare Case II(a) and Case III(c). From II(a), we have
RV Ne (R − RV Ne ) = I+Cωk(pi+τ) . From III(c), we have RV Ne (R − RV Ne ) = I+Cω2(pi+τ) . Therefore,
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, case III is preferred to case II.
As G increases, the expected payoff from case III decreases, since the VC ex post incentive
constraint becomes binding, distorting the optimal contract. The expected payoff from
case II is increasing in G.




, such that when G > G∗, the optimal















, we have the following pattern:













, case II is not relevant. The choice is between cases I, III and IV.




, case IV is not relevant. The choice is between cases I, II and III.
The following comparisons will help us examine these choices.




, we have Re(R−Re) = Cτωk
for case II and Re(R−Re) = Cτω2 for case III. Therefore, Re is higher in case III. And
F2 = (pi+ τ)
C
τ
− I−C = F3. Hence, U3 > U2 at G = ω−kω Cτ . As argued in part 1, as G
increases the expected payoff from case III decreases while the expected payoff from





such that when G > G+, case II dominates case III, and vice versa. The threshold
G+ decreases wtih µ.




, Re(R − Re) = Ipiωk for case
I and Re(R − Re) = Ipiω2 for case IV. Therefore, Re is higher in case IV. Hence,









, as G increases, the expected payoff from
case I increases. The expected payoff from case IV decreases because the VC ex post
incentive constraint becomes binding.




, such that when
G > G−, case I dominates case IV, and vice versa.




, Case III implies that ω2RV Ne (R−







2 + F3, F3 =
ω
ω−k (pi + τ)G − I − C. Case IV implies





, RNNe = R
V N











, case III dominates case IV.





implies that ω2RV Ne (R−RV Ne ) = Cτ , F3 = (pi+ τ)Cτ − I−C, U3 = pi+τ2 ω2(RV Ne )2 +F3.
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Case IV implies that ω2RNNe (R − RNNe ) = Ipi , F4 = 0, U4 = pi2ω2(RNNe )2. Therefore,
we have















+ , where  > 0 can be as small as we want.




2 + (pi + τ)
C
τ


















, case III is preferred to case IV. In case III, increasing C
τ
decreases the expected payoff from the contract because the ICV C ex ante is binding.
Therefore, as C
τ














, the choice switches to case IV








, such that for
G < Gˆ case IV is preferred to case III, and for G > Gˆ case III is preferred to case IV.
The threshold Gˆ increases with C
τ
.




, Case I implies that k2RV Ne (R −











2. Case III implies that ω2RV Ne (R−RV Ne ) = Cτ ,
F3 = (pi + τ)
C
τ
− I − C, U3 = pi+τ2 ω2(RV Ne )2 + piCτ − I.
Consider the value of C
τ
at which RV Ne is the same in case I and case III. It is straight-








. For this value, it is easy to see that case III is
preferred to case I. This will also be true for smaller values, since the expected payoff
from case I does not change while the expected payoff from case III decreases with C
τ
.













choice switches from case III to case I.












Case I implies that k2RV Ne (R − RV Ne ) = Ipi −G = Ipi − ω−kω Cτ , U1 = pi2k2(RV Ne )2. Case
III implies that ω2RV Ne (R − RV Ne ) = Cτ , F3 = piCτ − I, U3 = pi+τ2 ω2(RV Ne )2 + piCτ − I.
We proceed as above. Consider the value of C
τ
at which RV Ne is the same in case I and









. For this value, it is
easy to see that case III is preferred to case I. This will also be true for smaller values,
since the expected payoff from case I increases with G while the expected payoff from
case III decreases with C
τ














, the choice switches from case III to case I.











For case I, we have U1 =
pi
2




− I, U2 = pi+τ2 k2R2e + F2. Therefore, we have



























As τ increases, 4U21 increases. When τ ≥ 3pi, 4U21 > 0. Therefore, there must exist
a cutoff value, τ˜ < 3pi, such that














The expected payoff from case I is independent of C
τ
, while for case II it decreases
as C
τ
























• We can conclude from the discussion above that:








, such that when G > G∗, the









, such that when G > G+, case




, such that for G < Gˆ case IV
is preferred to case III, and for G > Gˆ case III is preferred to case IV. The threshold




for G > max[G+, C
τ
], the choice is case II
for G+ 6 G < C
τ
, the choice is between I and II
for C
τ





6 G < min[G+, C
τ














< G < Gˆ, the choice is between IV and I




< Gˆ, the choice is IV








, the choice is between I and III
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, the choice is III.





6.12 Proof of Proposition 2




, case O is equivalent to case IV
under VC finance, while for larger values of G case O dominates case IV since there is no binding
VC incentive constraint in case O. We assume that when the entrepreneur is indifferent between
VC and non-VC finance, he chooses non-VC finance. Thus we ignore case IV from now on and









, we know from Proposition 1 that under VC finance there exists a cutoff




, such that when G > G∗, case II is preferred, and otherwise, case III
is preferred.








, Re is higher in
case III than in case O. Hence, U3 > U0.




, as G decreases, the expected payoffs from case III and case O remain




, case III dominates case O.




, as G increases, the expected payoff from case III decreases because
the VC ex post incentive constraint is binding, while the expected payoff from case O





when G > G¨, case O is preferred to case III, otherwise, vice versa.












k2R2e, while for case O, we have ω
2Re(R − Re) = Ipi , U0 = pi2ω2R2e.
Therefore, we have

















) > 0 case II is preferred to case O. As µ decreases, ω increases, implying that
there exists a cutoff value µˆ such that
• when µ > µˆ, 4U20(G = ω−kω I+Cpi+τ ) > 0 , therefore case II dominates case O. More-
over, since the expected payoff from case II increases with G while the expected
payoff from case O does not change, the difference in expected payoffs will increase






• when µ < µˆ, 4U20(G = ω−kω I+Cpi+τ ) < 0 , therefore case O dominates case II.
We have proved above that case III dominates case O for G < G¨, and otherwise, vice
versa. Let µ˙ denote the cutoff value at which U3(G = G¨) = U2(G = G¨) = U0. Since
U0 does not change with G while U2 increases with G, we must have µ˙ < µˆ. Therefore,





< Gˇ < G¨, such that for G < Gˇ, case III is the optimal choice, while when
G > Gˇ, case II is preferred.
• when µ < µ˙, we have: for G < G¨, case III is preferred. For G¨ < G < ...G, case O
is preferred. And for G >
...













, we know that the results for case IV from Proposition 1 apply

















, case O is preferred to case III, and otherwise
case III is preferred to case O.




, the comparison between case III and case O is the same as at




, since the expected payoffs from case O and from case III do not













< G < I
pi
, compare case I with case O.
Case O implies that ω2Re(R−Re) = Ipi , U0 = pi2ω2(Re)2. Case I implies that k2RV Ne (R−
RV Ne ) =
I
pi
−G, U1 = pi2k2(RV Ne )2. Therefore, we have











, 4U10 < 0; then U1 increases with G
while U0 does not change. Thus we have two possibilities:
Either case O still dominates at G = I
pi

























< G < G˚, case O is
preferred to case I, and when G˚ < G < I
pi
, case I is preferred to case O. Denote by µ∗









Then for µ < µ∗, case O is preferred throughout the range. For µ > µ∗, the preference
switches to case I at G = G˚ < I
pi
.
From the above discussion, we can conclude that









know from Proposition 1 that U3 > U2. Thus we must have U0 > U2. Moreover, this
must be the case for lower values of G as well, since U2 is increasing in G and U0 does
not change with G. We have proved that case O is also preferred to case I for G < G˚.
Thus we must have two thresholds, G1 and G2, with G2 > G1, such that case O is
preferred for G 6 G1, case I is preferred for G1 < G < G2, and case II is preferred









. We know from Proposition




case O is preferred









, the optimal choice will never be case O. Then there will be two cutoff
values, G1 and G2, with G2 > G1, such that case III is preferred for G 6 G1, case I
is preferred for G1 < G < G2, and case II is preferred for G > G2. Otherwise, there








the payoff from case III decreases with G. There will then be three cutoff values, G1,
G2, and G3, with G3 > G2 > G1, such that case III is preferred for G 6 G1, case
0 is preferred for G1 < G < G2, case I is preferred for G2 < G < G3, and case II is
preferred for G > G3. The threshold G2 decreases with µ.
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6.13 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The optimal contracts for not to patent, patent without licensing, and patent with
licensing are respectively the largest root of the following equations:
piω2RNe (R−RNe ) = I (17)
pi[β + (1− β)z2]Rˆ(R− Rˆ) = I (18)
pi[βk2 + (1− β)z2] ˆˆR(R− ˆˆR) = I − piβL (19)
The expected profit of entrepreneur for not to patent, patent without licensing, and patent with













[βk2 + (1− β)z2] ˆˆR2 (22)
From (17) and (18), we can see that as long as ω2 < β + (1 − β)z2, Rˆ is larger than RNe . In
this situation, (20) and (21) tell us that patent without licensing is strictly favorable than not
to patent.
Therefore, when ω2 < β + (1 − β)z2, not to patent is dominated and can be ignored, we
only need to focus on the two cases patent without licensing and patent with licensing: When
ˆˆ
R = Rˆ, subtracting these two equations in both sides gives us (1−k2)piβRˆ(R− Rˆ) = piβL. From
equation (18), we know that Rˆ(R− Rˆ) = I
pi[β+(1−β)z2] , therefore, it gives us
L∗ =
(1− k2)I
pi[β + (1− β)z2]
The utility from patenting without licensing is given as UP =
pi
2
[β + (1 − β)z2]Rˆ2, while the
utility from patenting with licensing is given as UPL =
pi
2
[βk2 + (1 − β)z2] ˆˆR2. Since k < 1,
if licensing is preferable, it must be
ˆˆ
R > Rˆ. We can see from (19) that
ˆˆ
R is monotonically
increasing with L until L = I
piβ
. Therefore, if UPL(L =
I
piβ
) < UP , patent without licensing
will always be preferred to patent with licensing; Otherwise, there exists a cutoff value, LN ,
under which UPL(L = L
N) = UP , and when L > L
N , UPL > UP . Define a = [β + (1 − β)z2],











Equation (18) and (19) can be rewritten as
piaRRˆ− piaRˆ2 = I (24)
pibR
ˆˆ
R− pib ˆˆR2 = I − piβLN (25)
Plug equation (23) in to the above equations, and subtract them from both sides, we have








, where Rˆ and
ˆˆ
R are the largest root of equation (24) and
(25).
When ω2 > β + (1− β)z2, patent without license is dominated by not to patent, and can be
ignored, we only need to focus on the two cases not to patent and patent with licensing:
Similar to the above situation, we can see from (19) that
ˆˆ
R is monotonically increasing with L
until L = I
piβ
. Therefore, if UPL(L =
I
piβ
) < UNP , not to patent will always be preferred to patent
with licensing; Otherwise, there exists a cutoff value, LP , under which UPL(L = L
P ) = UNP ,
and when L > LP , UPL > UNP .











Equation (17) and (19) can be rewritten as
picRRNe − pic(RNe )2 = I (27)
pibR
ˆˆ
R− pib ˆˆR2 = I − piβLP (28)
Plug equation (26) in to the above equations, and subtract them from both sides, we have









, where RNe and
ˆˆ
R are the largest root of equation (27)
and (28). Since c > b & RNe > Rˆ, therefore L
P > LN .
6.14 Proofs for Section 4.4
Proof. To prove the results summarized in section 4.4, we first derive the optimal financial
contracts between the entrepreneur and the VC for the following three cases:
• Case I: Outward knowledge transfer when patent is rejected
• Case II: Inward knowledge transfer and outward knowledge transfer when patent is rejected
• Case III: Inward knowledge transfer
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s.t. eAP = RAPe , e
AR = kRARe (ICe)
pi{βeAP (R−RAPe ) + (1− β)[eARk(R−RARe ) +G]} ≥ I (PCV C)
τ{βeAP (R−RAPe ) + (1− β)[eARk(R−RARe ) +G]} ≤ C (ICV C ex ante)
keAR(R−RARe ) +G ≥ zeAR(R−RARe )(ICV C ex post)
From (ICV C ex ante) and (PCV C), we see that
C
τ
≥ βeAP (R − RAPe ) + (1 − β)[eARk(R −
RARe ) +G] ≥ Ipi . It holds only when Cτ ≥ Ipi .
Comparing to Problem 7 (P7), this problem (P9) differs in two ways: first, there is the
additional (ICV C ex ante) to be satisfied. Second, in section 4.2(P7), we assume G ≤ Ipi for
simplicity, while in P9, we remove this assumption so that the results are comparable with those
for non-patentable innovations in section 3.
To meet the constraint ICV C ex ante, we must have
C
τ
≥ (1− β)G. Therefore,
• when C
τ
≥ (1 − β)G ≥ I
pi
, it’s possible to set RAPe = R
AR
e = R and all the constraints are
satisfied. If PCV C holds with stictly inequality, the VC can provide ex ante additional fee,
F , to the entrepreneur, such that pi(1− β)G = I + F .
• when (1 − β)G ≤ I
pi






(ICV C ex ante) will always be satisfied. Thus the results are the same as in Lemma 7
(cases 2, 3 and 4).





(pi + τ){β[eAPRAPe −
1
2




s.t. eAP = RAPe , e
AR = kRARe (ICe)
(pi + τ){βeAP (R−RAPe ) + (1− β)[eARk(R−RARe ) +G]} ≥ I + C (PCV C)
τ{βeAP (R−RAPe ) + (1− β)[eARk(R−RARe ) +G]} ≥ C (ICV C ex ante)
keAR(R−RARe ) +G ≥ zeAR(R−RARe )(ICV C ex post)
From (ICV C ex post), we have
G ≥ (z − k)kRARe (R−RARe ) (29)
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By rewriting PCV C and ICV C ex ante, we have








Combining these two inequalities, we have






} − (1− β)G (30)
Suppose (29) is satisfied. Then at optimum, (30) must be binding. Therefore, the Lagrangian
function gives us, at optimum, RAPe = R
AR
e ≡ ˜˜R, where ˜˜R is the largest root of (30) when it is
binding.
Substituting this back into (30)(binding) and (29), we have
G ≥ k(z − k)
z(1− β)k + βΓ





When G < k(z−k)
z(1−β)k+βΓ, (29) will not be satified. By increasing R
AR
e , it is possible to make
(29) binding. Therefore, the optimal contract RARe is the largest root of the following equation:
G = (z − k)kRARe (R−RARe ) (31)
and RAPe is the largest root of the following equation, given that R
AR
e has been determined by
equation (31).






} − (1− β)G
From expression (30), it is easy to find out that when G ≥ Γ
1−β , the optimal contract is
RAPe = R
AR
e = R. In this case, ICV C ex post is alwary satisfied. PCV C and ICV C ex ante are
also satisfied as inequality (30) holds.
When Γ
1−β > G ≥ k(z−k)z(1−β)k+βΓ,ICV C ex post is alwary satisfied. Expression (30) must be
binding, which implies that either PCV C or ICV C ex ante will be binding in optimum, depending








, then PCV C will be binding; and vice versa.





z(1−β)k+βΓ > G ≥ Γ(z−k)z(1−β) , ICV C ex post is binding. The optimal contract RARe is the
largest root of the binding ICV C ex post. And R
AP
e is the largest root of the binding (30) given
51











, such that the participation constraint of VC is slack, then VC would pay an
extra fee ex ante, F, to the entrepreneur such that (pi + τ){βeAP (R−RAPe ) + (1− β)[eARk(R−
RARe ) +G]} = I + C + F . VCs always earn zero expected rents as they are competitive.





β + (1− β)k2







β + (1− β)k2





(pi + τ){β[eAPRAPe −
1
2




s.t. eAP = RAPe , e
AR = zRARe (ICe)
(pi + τ){βeAP (R−RAPe ) + (1− β)eARz(R−RARe )} ≥ I + C (PCV C)
τ{βeAP (R−RAPe ) + (1− β)eARz(R−RARe )} ≥ C (ICV C ex ante)
keAR(R−RARe ) +G ≤ zeAR(R−RARe )(ICV C ex post)
Similar as the Proof for Case II, from PCV C and ICV C ex ante, we have
βRAPe (R−RAPe ) + (1− β)z2RARe (R−RARe ) ≥ Γ (32)
From ICV C ex post, we have
G ≤ (z − k)zRARe (R−RARe ) (33)
If expression (33) holds with inequality, then at optimum, expression (32) must hold with
equality, i.e. βRAPe (R−RAPe ) + (1− β)z2RARe (R−RARe ) = Γ. The Lagrangian method gives us,
RAPe = R
AR
e ≡ R¯, which is the largest root of the following equation
[β + (1− β)z2]R¯(R− R¯) = Γ. (34)
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Substituting it back into (33), we have
G ≤ (z − k)z
β + (1− β)z2 Γ









, ICV C ex ante is binding and PCV C is slack; vice versa. )
When the VC participation constraint is slack, then VC would pay an extra fee ex ante, F, to
the entrepreneur such that (pi + τ)[β + (1− β)z2]R¯(R− R¯) = I + C + F . VCs always earn zero
expected rents as they are competitive. The optimal contract is the largest root of the equation
(34). The problem has a solution only when 1
4
R2[β + (1− β)z2] ≥ Γ as R¯(R− R¯) ≤ 1
4
R2.
If expression (33) holds with equality (i.e., G ≥ (z−k)z
β+(1−β)z2Γ ), the optimal contract for R
AR
e is
the largest root of the following equation:
G = (z − k)zRARe (R−RARe ). (35)
It is easy to see that in this case, RARe < R
AP




e is determined by
βRAPe (R−RAPe ) = Γ−
(1− β)z
z − k G
The problem has a solution only when G ≤ 1
4
(z − k)zR2. If G > z−k
(1−β)zΓ, the optimal contract
implies RAPe = R, R
AR
e is determined by (35), and VC pays an ex-ante fee to ensure PCV C holds
as an equality.
Now that we have derived optimal VC contracts for Cases I, II and III, we need to show that
when the VC ex post incentive constraint is binding, the following holds:
(1) the optimal VC contract with outward knowledge transfer (and no inward transfer), i.e.
Case I, is dominated by non-VC finance;
(2) the optimal VC contract with both outward and inward knowledge transfer, i.e. Case II,
is dominated by the optimal VC contract with only inward knowledge transfer, i.e. Case III.
Proof.
• Comparing Case I with non-VC finance when ICV C ex post is binding.





R, which satisfies the PCV C as an equality.
Consider the value of G such that ICV C ex post holds as an equality: G = (z−k)k ˆˆR(R− ˆˆR).
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Substituting this into binding PCV C we have
ˆˆ
R(R− ˆˆR) = I
pi[β + (1− β)kz]
Now consider the optimal contract for non-VC finance: from Lemma 5 we have RPe = R
R
e =
Rˆ, which satisfies the investor’s participation constraint as an equality. Thus,
Rˆ(R− Rˆ) = I
pi[β + (1− β)z2]
Since z > k, we find that Rˆ >
ˆˆ
R, therefore non-VC finance is better.
For any value of G lower than G = (z−k)k ˆˆR(R− ˆˆR) , the ICV C ex post becomes binding in
the VC contract, distorting the contract and decreasing the entrepreneur’s expected utility,
while his expected utility from non-VC finance is unchanged.
Hence, the expected utility from the VC contract will be lower than from non-VC finance
whenever the ICV C ex post is binding in the former.
• Comparing Case II with Case III when ICV C ex post is binding.
As in the previous case, suppose in Case II that ICV C ex post and ICV C ex ante are not
binding, the optimal contract for case II is RAPe = R
AR
e =
˜˜R, which satisfies the (30) as an
equality.
Consider the value of G such that ICV C ex post holds as an equality: G¯ = (z−k)k ˜˜R(R− ˜˜R).
Substituting this value into binding (30), we have
˜˜R(R− ˜˜R) = Γ
[β + (1− β)zk]
And G¯ = k(z−k)
z(1−β)k+βΓ.
Now consider the optimal contract for Case III, as we could see from the Proof of Proposi-
tion 4, when G = G¯ < z(z−k)




e = R¯, which
satisfies (32) as an equality. Thus
R¯(R− R¯) = Γ
[β + (1− β)z2]
It is easy to see that R¯ > ˜˜R. Therefore Case III dominates Case II at G = G¯.
For any value of G lower than G¯, the ICV C ex post is binding in Case II, distoring the
contract and decreasing the entrepreneur’s expected utility, while ICV C ex post is always
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satisfied in Case III, and the expected utility from Case III is unchanged.
Hence, the expected utility from Case II (inward+outward knowledge transfer) will be
lower than that from case III (inward knowledge transfer) when the ICV C ex post for Case
II is binding.
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